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CURRENT AND POTENTIAL CAPACITY FOR THE
PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE AND MASS ATROCITIES
WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
Deborah Mayersen
Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect,
School of Political Science and International Studies, The University of Queensland.
d.mayersen@uq.edu.au

At the World Summit in 2005, United Nations Member States unanimously endorsed the
‘Responsibility to Protect’. This acknowledged the responsibility of states to protect their
populations from genocide and mass atrocities, but also that of the international community,
acting “through the United Nations”. A strong focus of the statement is on the necessity of
prevention, and the appropriate “diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means” the
United Nations can employ in its service. But what capacity does the United Nations
currently have to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity and ethnic cleansing through preventative action? Is it adequate, or are there areas
where capacity building is required? This paper will explore the current capacity to meet the
preventive component of the responsibility to protect within the United Nations system. It
will identify areas of strength that might be more explicitly utilised in support of prevention
measures, and areas in which there are opportunities for improvement. It will also consider
the potential of mainstreaming Responsibility to Protect considerations across the United
Nations system, and the potential for UN involvement in contributing to longer-term,
structural prevention.

INTRODUCTION
Unanimity is rare at the United Nations. It is a testament to the strength of world opinion,
therefore, that the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ was unanimously endorsed by the international
community at the World Summit in 2005. The Responsibility to Protect, or RtoP as it is
commonly known, reaffirmed the responsibility of the international community to prevent
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and highlighted the
central role of the United Nations (UN) in meeting this responsibility. It asserted a broad role
for the UN; not only responding to crises and imminent emergencies, but also providing an
early warning mechanism, supporting the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide,
and supporting the international community in taking preventive action to assist “those which
are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.”1 The endorsement of RtoP is certainly
a positive step for mass atrocity prevention. Yet the scope of the challenge is daunting. The
twentieth century earned the moniker ‘the century of genocide’; the bloodiest in world
history. The record of the UN itself was far from blameless, particularly with respect to the
1994 Rwandan genocide and 1995 genocide in Srebrenica. Moreover, as recently as 2009 the
Secretary-General acknowledged the UN remained “underprepared” to meet it’s “most
fundamental prevention” responsibilities with respect to RtoP.2 The present article, therefore,
seeks to explore the current capacity of the UN system to meet these responsibilities for mass
atrocity prevention. Through examining key organs of the UN system, it will consider areas
of strength, and gaps within the present capacity. It will explore possible approaches to
augmenting capacity, including within specific organs and through mainstreaming RtoP
considerations. Finally, it will also consider the capacity of the UN system to contribute to
longer-term, structural prevention.
A History of Rhetoric and Inaction
“There can be no more important issue, and no more binding obligation, than the prevention
of genocide. Indeed, this may be considered one of the original purposes of the United
Nations.”3
Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, January 2004

The prevention of genocide has been a core goal of the United Nations since its inception in
the aftermath of World War Two. In 1946, in its inaugural session, General Assembly
resolution 96 (I) declared “genocide is a crime under international law which the civilised
world condemns.” 4 It invited Member States to enact domestic legislation for the prevention
and punishment of genocide, and recommended “that international cooperation be organised
between States” for this purpose.5 It further requested that a convention on the crime be
drafted for consideration at the next regular session of the General Assembly. The resulting
Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was finalised
with astonishing speed and adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1948. It is
regarded as the first “modern human rights treaty”, being adopted even before the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.6

Yet in the six decades since the Genocide Convention came into force in 1951, it is widely
recognised that the record of the UN in preventing genocide has been abysmal. The UN
commitment to genocide prevention, while consistent at the rhetoric level, failed to translate
into meaningful preventive action.
During the period of the Cold War, the UN was
paralysed by the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was unable to
respond to the genocides in Bangladesh or Cambodia, or to act in a pre-emptory capacity “to
prevent” the commission of genocide. In the post-Cold War era, there was renewed hope that
the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, could serve as the ‘global
peacekeeper’.7 This was quickly dashed by the massive failures of the UN system associated
with the 1994 Rwandan genocide and 1995 genocide in Srebrenica. In Rwanda, for example,
the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) largely withdrew as the
genocide commenced. The mass killing progressed unimpeded as the UN Security Council
bickered over an appropriate course of action. Later, the Independent Inquiry commissioned
to investigate UN actions concluded:
The response of the United Nations before and during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda failed in
a number of fundamental respects. The responsibility for the failings of the United Nations to
prevent and stop the genocide in Rwanda lies with a number of different actors, in particular
the Secretary-General, the Secretariat, the Security Council, UNAMIR and the broader
membership of the United Nations.8

In Srebrenica, the failure of the UN-declared ‘safe area’ led to the slaughter of over 7000
Bosnian men and boys. Again, a subsequent report recognised the failure of the UN “to help
save the people of Srebrenica from the Serb campaign of mass murder.”9
Yet despite these massive failures there have been relatively few calls for international efforts
to prevent genocide and mass atrocities to move beyond the United Nations. Even the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention in Kosovo, despite its largely successful
mission, provoked controversy rather than increased support for actors working outside the
UN system. While the NATO intervention undoubtedly saved Kosovo Albanian civilians
from being targeted by Serb forces, the absence of a UN Security Council resolution
authorising the military action led to adverse international reaction. As the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) subsequently remarked, “The
task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the
Security Council work much better than it has.”10 The UN retains a unique universal
legitimacy, and remains “unquestionably the principal institution for building, consolidating
and using the authority of the international community.”11 Ongoing efforts to prevent
genocide and mass atrocities have thus continued to focus upon improving the capacity of the
UN system, the political will of key Member States, and learning lessons from the failures of
the recent past.
The Responsibility to Protect
In the last decade, much of this effort has centred around the new norm of the ‘Responsibility
to Protect’. The concept of RtoP emerged from the ICISS in 2001. Established partially in
response to the international failure to respond to the Rwandan genocide, the Commission

sought to reconceptualise the potential conflict between state sovereignty and humanitarian
intervention. The resulting shift to ‘responsibilities,’ rather than ‘rights,’ reframed the
discussion. At the World Summit in 2005, the Responsibility to Protect was unanimously
endorsed by UN Member States. Member States acknowledged their primary responsibility
to protect their populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against
humanity. They recognised the value of international assistance in enabling States to meet
this responsibility. In the event of a State “manifestly failing” to protect its population,
responsibility to act “in a timely and decisive manner” fell to the international community,
acting collectively through the United Nations Security Council.12
Within the Responsibility to Protect is an important preventive component. Member States
affirmed “This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.”13 The Summit Declaration advocates
the establishment of an early warning capability at the United Nations; Member States also
affirmed they “fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on
the Prevention of Genocide.”14 Additionally, they committed “to helping States build
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts
break out.”15 The preventive component of RtoP has attracted particularly strong
international support. At the General Assembly discussion on RtoP in July 2009, for
example, many States focussed particularly on the necessity for prevention. There is thus
widespread international agreement on the need for the prevention of genocide and mass
atrocities, and on the central role of the UN in facilitating and contributing to this task.

UNITED NATIONS CAPACITY FOR MASS ATROCITY PREVENTION
RtoP delineates a broad yet specific role for the UN in mass atrocity prevention, in a manner
not previously enunciated. In the five years since 2005, however, there has been relatively
little analysis of the current and potential capacity of the UN system to undertake this
preventive role. Much greater attention has been given to role of the Security Council when
mass atrocity crimes have appeared imminent or already been underway. Integral to RtoP,
however, is also longer-term preventive work in “capacity building,” and “assisting those
which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.”16 Furthermore, where such
analysis has occurred, the results have been concerning. In 2009, for example, nine years
after the release of the official reports on UN actions during the Rwandan genocide and the
fall of Srebrenica, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged “many of their
institutional recommendations, including on early warning, analysis and training, have not
been fully implemented ... The United Nations and its Member States remain underprepared
to meet their most fundamental prevention and protection responsibilities.”17 It is only
through a nuanced analysis that the current capacity of the UN system for prevention
activities can be assessed, and key strengths and areas for improvement identified. Of course
a single paper cannot provide a comprehensive analysis of the full range of UN organs;
nevertheless this paper seeks to contribute to this goal through selective examination of key

components of the UN system.
components in turn.

The following section will explore a number of such

Office of the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide
The Office of the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG) is the central
focal point for prevention within the United Nations system.18 With a small staff, this
recently established office is mandated to collect existing information on “massive and
serious” human rights and international humanitarian law violations that might lead to
genocide; act as an early warning mechanism to the Secretary-General, “and through him to
the Security Council”; make recommendations to the Security Council (through the
Secretary-General) on preventive actions; and finally “liaise with the United Nations system
on activities for the prevention of genocide.”19 The OSAPG has developed an ‘Analysis
Framework’ through which it assesses the risk of genocide. Eight factors have been
identified that ‘cumulatively increase risk of genocide’, including tense inter-group relations,
weak institutional capacity to prevent genocide, the presence of illegal arms, underlying
motivation to target a group, circumstances that facilitate perpetration of genocide, acts that
could be elements of genocide, evidence of ‘intent to destroy in whole or in part’, and
triggering factors such as elections.20 Currently, the Office has identified three central
priorities.21 First, it seeks to ‘raise awareness’ through high-level events on genocide
prevention and RtoP, and through training of UN staff and government officials. Secondly, it
will “analyse situations of concern”; provide timely advice to the Secretary-General and the
Security Council; and engage the General Assembly in dialogue on early warning and
assessment. Finally, through ‘advocacy’ the Office seeks to “advise the Secretary-General on
preventive action”, mobilise the UN system “and other key partners”, and conduct advocacy
missions in cases when they are of particular value.
Through its mandate, however, the OSAPG is limited specifically to focussing upon genocide
prevention. It is beyond the remit of the Office to undertake the wider task of “establishing
an early warning capability” for the other mass atrocities specified as part of RtoP, including
ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity.22 Additionally, whereas the
position of the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG) is a full-time, paid
position with support staff, the corresponding position of the Special Advisor for the
Responsibility to Protect lacks this institutionalisation. At present, therefore, the Special
Advisor for RtoP lacks the capacity to develop an early warning capability for other mass
atrocities. This is of particular concern given the “different precursors, root causes, and
triggers” for each crime, necessitating a tailored approach for information gathering and early
warning in each case.23 The Secretary-General’s plan to establish a joint office for the
Special Advisors on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect may lead to
an integrated effort to establish the early warning capability for RtoP crimes endorsed in the
2005 Statement.24 Whether the plan can overcome the financial and other barriers necessary
for its enactment, however, remains unclear.
Beyond its own currently developing capacity, there are opportunities for the OSAPG to
build the capacity of the wider UN system to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. In

particular, the OSAPG is well-placed to lead an initiative to operationalise, or ‘mainstream’
the preventive component of the Responsibility to Protect throughout the UN system. With
appropriate training and awareness, incorporating RtoP considerations into the normal
operating procedures of relevant UN organs and programs could have a significant impact on
prevention. This could include utilising UN agencies and field staff to provide information
relevant for an early warning system. It might incorporate the inclusion of specific
preventive capacity building measures within preventive deployments or development
assistance programs in at-risk nations. It may involve extending the conflict-sensitive
development capabilities of the World Bank to include explicit consideration of RtoP risk
factors. The potential of the OSAPG to have a greater impact through utilising the wider UN
system is substantial. The small size of the Office and the complexities of inter-agency
cooperation, however, indicate that at present a strategic approach is most likely to be
effective. In particular, a review by the OSAPG of the capacity of the UN system for
genocide prevention (and mass atrocity prevention should a joint office be established) would
enable rapid identification of areas where there are opportunities to have maximal impact,
and areas in which urgent improvement is required. This review could utilise the 2006
review of the UN system’s capacity for conflict prevention, undertaking further analysis
focussing specifically on genocide or the four RtoP crimes.25
There is also scope for a strategic decision regarding the balance between operational
prevention – designed to have a short to medium term impact in States already at risk of mass
atrocities – and structural, long-term prevention measures. According to Lawrence Woocher
from the Centre for International Confliction Resolution, “The origins and terms of the
Special Advisor’s mandate strongly suggest the office was intended to concentrate on early
warning for immediate and medium-term operational prevention rather than long-term
structural prevention.”26 Yet a narrow focus on operational prevention might overlook the
potential benefits of structural prevention work. Furthermore, the Secretary-General’s 2009
report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect highlighted structural prevention as an
important component of preventive action.27 Research on the antecedents of genocide
indicates that many of the risk factors can exist decades in advance of a genocidal event.28
Moreover, commonly identified risk factors such as economic distress and legal
discrimination against a minority may require long-term strategies for amelioration.
The OSAPG is uniquely placed to encourage agencies such as the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to
incorporate RtoP considerations within their programs, and potentially utilise strategies
within them that contribute to the structural prevention of genocide and mass atrocities in
tandem with their own developmental goals. RtoP researcher Eli Stamnes has suggested a
‘quiet’ approach to this kind of long-term structural prevention, to avoid “weakening” the
RtoP concept.29 Indeed, she has advocated avoiding “direct appeals” to the concept of RtoP
for such structural prevention work.30 This approach, however, may inadvertently undermine
the perceived importance of structural prevention, and prevent the OSAPG from using the
persuasive power of RtoP to promote structural prevention. An alternative might be to
simply utilise the label of ‘RtoP structural prevention’. This has the additional appeal of

enabling States to incorporate measures to reduce risk without being forced to acknowledge a
pre-existing elevated risk – a politically sensitive issue. The small size of the OSAPG, and
the large magnitude of mass atrocity prevention, indicate that leveraging off the wider UN
system in this way could substantially increase its overall impact.
Security Council
The Security Council bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security
internationally.31 With a massive agenda and intense pressures upon its resources, it typically
focuses upon situations of crisis or imminent crisis.32 Its history with respect to the
prevention of genocide and mass atrocities is most notable for its failure to prevent or curb
the Rwandan genocide. Even as the full horror of the genocide became apparent during the
course of April 1994, the Council failed to respond effectively. The Council’s (in)action with
respect to events in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, and its dithering and largely ineffective
response to the situation in Darfur in recent years have further contributed to a reputation of
failure even in the most dire of circumstances. Nevertheless, the Security Council does have
substantial capacity to impact upon the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities.33 The
primary issue is rather one of political will.34 As the political scientists Wheeler and Egerton
noted: “The real test of the Summit Declaration is whether it increases the likelihood of the
Council mustering the political will to act to prevent and halt future humanitarian crises.”35
A number of the ways in which the Security Council can impact upon the prevention of
genocide and mass atrocities are enumerated below. For each of them, however, the critical
issue of political will remains a key factor in determining the Council’s approach.
The greatest contribution the Security Council can make to mass atrocity prevention is
through providing a credible threat of reaction. Genocide is often a quasi-rational tactic,
chosen as a deliberate strategy with a realistic prospect of meeting the desired goals of a
perpetrator regime – however irrational the goals themselves may be.36 A genuine, ongoing
likelihood of Security Council intervention, however, is likely to change the calculus of
potential perpetrators. There are several ways through which the Security Council could
pursue this goal. Most ambitiously, there have been multiple proposals for a “rapidly
deployable, robust military force, which can be threatened or used to deter or halt genocidal
crimes.”37 Currently, however, there are substantial obstacles associated with this option,
including political dissension and practical constraints.38 More realistic, perhaps, are formal
and informal opportunities to change the way the veto, and the threat of veto, are used around
resolutions pertinent to preventing or curbing mass atrocities. In recent years, this has
already undergone something of a process of change:
The costs of using a veto in the UN Security Council in cases of emerging genocide or mass
atrocities are now extremely high and the international community generally appears much
less likely to “look the other way” in such situations than it was even a decade ago. However,
ensuring an effective response is another matter.39

In place of the formal veto, the use of the ‘informal veto’, whereby a resolution is not
formally put to a vote or is substantially weakened due to a prior indication that a member of
the P5 is likely to veto it, has come to play an increasingly significant role in relevant

resolutions. This has repeatedly occurred in resolutions surrounding the mass atrocities in
Darfur, both delaying them and weakening their content.40 A stronger and more consistent
commitment to a “timely and decisive” response to mass atrocity crimes could become a
deterrent force over time.41 The lack of such a credible threat of reaction, however, can
substantially undermine wider preventive efforts, such as preventive diplomacy. Arguably,
this is the largest and most concerning gap in the present capacity of the UN system for mass
atrocity prevention.
The Security Council also has a clear opportunity to communicate the importance of mass
atrocity prevention to the international community through the setting of its agenda.
Ensuring that potential RtoP crises are rapidly considered, and allowing the Special Advisor
for the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG) to directly brief the Council when appropriate, would
effectively communicate that the Council considered these matters of great importance. In
the past, this has not always occurred. In 2005, for example, former SAPG Juan Mendez was
blocked from briefing the Security Council on his visit to Darfur.42 Additionally, the Security
Council has an opportunity to contribute directly to mass atrocity prevention through
authorising peacekeeping operations and preventive deployments with appropriately robust
mandates. The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia in
the 1990s, for example, is widely considered as a successful preventive deployment. Recent
research by Erik Melander indicates that statistically, peacekeeping missions appear to
“reduce the risk that mass killings of civilians will commence in intrastate armed conflicts”.43
Finally, preventive diplomacy can also be utilised by the Security Council more often, and at
earlier stages of conflict.44
General Assembly
Apart from the Security Council and the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, the
General Assembly is the only other organ of the UN specifically mentioned in the paragraphs
on RtoP in the World Summit Outcome Document. The statement asserts: “We stress the
need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its
implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law.”45 This
highlights the important function of the General Assembly with respect to the normative
development of RtoP. As the UN’s most representative body, the General Assembly is the
most appropriate location for intergovernmental dialogue on the concept, and for developing
consensus around approaches to implementing it.46 In particular, the General Assembly
provides a forum for discussion of what types of action might contribute to prevention.
While the General Assembly lacks the power to authorise direct preventive action in a
specific situation, broad-based support for particular kinds of preventive strategies could
promote and grant substantial legitimacy to their use in nations ‘under stress’. Periodic
discussion of RtoP in the General Assembly can also contribute to ensuring its ongoing
importance within the international community.
The General Assembly can contribute directly to the UN’s capacity for mass atrocity
prevention through providing appropriate funding for the OSAPG or the proposed joint office

for the SAPG and the Special Advisor for RtoP. Currently, the OSAPG is funded both
through the regular budget of the UN and voluntary contributions; in the past, however, a
proposal for funding for the implementation of RtoP was not supported by the Fifth
Committee.47 The approval of funding for the proposed joint office, at the appropriate time,
would improve UN capacity for early warning and prevention of the four RtoP crimes.
There are only limited opportunities for the General Assembly to directly contribute to
prevention in specific crises. In circumstances of major crisis in which the Security Council
is unable to act due to divisions, there is the possibility of invoking the ‘Uniting for Peace’
resolution. According to this resolution, “in situations where the Security Council fails to
exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the
General Assembly may make recommendations to members for collective measures.”48 As
the ICISS report acknowledged, however, “The practical difficulty in all of this is to
contemplate the unlikelihood, in any but very exceptional case, of a two-thirds majority, as
required under the Uniting for Peace procedure, being able to be put together in a political
environment in which there has been either no majority on the Security Council, or a veto
imposed or threatened by one or more permanent members.”49 Nevertheless, the ICISS
suggested, the possibility of a Uniting for Peace procedure could encourage decisive action
from the Security Council.50 Additionally, the General Assembly can consider crises not on
the agenda of the Security Council, both as an alternative to the Council and a mechanism to
encourage the Council to consider them in turn.51 Overall, however, the General Assembly
has a fairly limited capacity to contribute to the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities
beyond at a rhetorical level.
Secretariat
The Secretariat, headed by the Secretary-General, is the administrative organ of the UN.
With close to 40,000 staff across several departments and offices the Secretariat is
responsible for the implementation of UN mandates internationally.52
While a
comprehensive examination of the departments of the Secretariat is beyond the remit of the
present paper, the key roles of the Secretary-General and the Department of Political Affairs
will be considered.
The Secretary-General
Leading the Secretariat, the Secretary-General has a unique ability to influence the path of the
UN system. The practical and moral leadership of the Secretary-General is an important
driver of the implementation of RtoP within the UN. Successive Secretary-Generals have
focussed upon the need to progress from a ‘culture of reaction’ to a ‘culture of prevention’
with respect both to conflict prevention broadly, and more recently RtoP crimes
specifically.53 The establishment of the OSAPG, for example, institutionalises a preventive
approach within the Secretariat. An established ‘culture of risk aversion’, however, has often
prevailed over the possibility of preventive action in the past.54 The issue of political will, it
seems, “remains the essential challenge to a culture of prevention.”55 Nevertheless, the
current Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, has demonstrated a substantial commitment to mass

atrocity prevention through the expansion of the role of SAPG from part-time to full-time,
through expansion of the OSAPG, and through regular reports and statements on RtoP and its
implementation.
There are considerable opportunities for the Secretary-General to take further action.
Understanding of RtoP within parts of the Secretariat remains limited, and high-level
outreach and training could be beneficial.56 Moreover, the idea of mainstreaming RtoP
throughout the UN system, including in the standard operating procedures of the departments
of the Secretariat, is gaining increasing support.57 Incorporating explicit consideration of
RtoP within the mandates of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR), for example, could substantially increase UN capacity for
preventive action. The Secretary-General could directly promote this consideration through
requests for reports to include specific discussion of RtoP where relevant. In turn, the
Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council could incorporate this information,
highlighting the importance of RtoP considerations in the decision-making process.58
The ‘good offices’ function of the Office of the Secretary-General is an important component
of the UN’s capacity for mass atrocity prevention. The good offices function can be
understood as “the independent political role of the Secretary-General in preventing or
mediating conflicts among, and more recently within, States.”59 The Secretary-General can
utilise the good offices function to privately mediate potential RtoP conflicts at times of
imminent crisis.60 The Secretary-General enjoys a reputation as a reasonably impartial actor,
in whom many states place a high level of trust.61 Moreover, under Article 99 of the UN
Charter, the Secretary-General has the opportunity to bring to the attention of the Security
Council “any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international
peace and security.”62 Judicious use of this provision, or a gentle reminder of its possible use
in appropriate situations, may further strengthen this aspect of the Secretary-General’s
position.
Department of Political Affairs
The Secretariat, and within it the Department of Political Affairs, is the central focal point for
preventive diplomacy within the UN system. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has
substantially increased its focus upon and capacity for preventive diplomacy.63 These efforts
have met with at least some success – according to the 2005 Human Security report, they
have both prevented the escalation of multiple potential conflicts and resulted in a number of
peace agreements for conflicts already underway.64 In 2006, the Mediation Support Unit was
established within the DPA “as a central repository for peacemaking experience and a
clearing house for lessons learned and best practices.”65 Additionally, the ‘Mediation
Support Standby Team’, established in 2008, “is a five-person expert team that can be
deployed on short notice to assist UN and non-UN mediation efforts around the world.”66
Nevertheless, it is well recognised that the DPA’s prevention capacity could be strengthened
further, and utilised more assertively.67 The endorsement of Secretary-General Ban Ki-

moon’s proposals for strengthening the capacity of the DPA for preventive diplomacy and
peacemaking would further enhance the capacity of the DPA for mass atrocity prevention.68

Additional areas of Preventive Capacity within the United Nations System
There are a number of further important foci for mass atrocity prevention within the UN
system. The judicial organs of the system, including the International Court of Justice, the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the hybrid
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and International Criminal Court (which
is independent from the UN but works in cooperation with it), have received considerable
attention regarding their preventive capacity through a deterrent effect. As the SAPG has
commented with respect to these judicial organs within the UN system, “Justice is not only
one of our main goals; it is in itself an important means of prevention.”69 At times the threat
of justice does appear to have proved an effective deterrent, such as in 2004 when the SAPG
reminded leaders in Côte D’Ivoire that could be held criminally liable for exacerbating interethnic tensions through xenophobic hate speech.70 However the power of deterrence for
prevention remains controversial and contested.71
A number of other organs of the UN system can be identified as having a strong potential
capacity to contribute to mass atrocity prevention, even if that capacity is largely to yet be
realised. The Human Rights Council has the potential to contribute substantially, although at
less than five years old, it has yet to have a meaningful impact. The Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees also has the potential to integrate specific RtoP considerations
into its normal operating procedures. Refugees can be “not only a symptom but often a
potential cause of RtoP situations;” programs concerning refugees should therefore ideally
consider and seek to mitigate any identified risks where possible.72 Other organs, discussed
below, have greater potential for longer-term preventive strategies.

UNITED NATIONS CAPACITY FOR STRUCTURAL PREVENTION
Consideration of UN capacity for mass atrocity prevention has predominantly focussed upon
the capacity for short-term and medium-term preventive action. Woocher and others have
suggested that the mandate of the OSAPG advocates the primacy of operational prevention;
while Stamnes has suggested avoiding the term RtoP altogether when considering structural,
long-term prevention.73 The political scientist Alex Bellamy has outlined a number of
potential difficulties associated with incorporating structural prevention within the remit of
RtoP, including that of establishing direct causal links between structural prevention
measures and outcomes, and garnering political support.74 As human rights lawyer and
researcher Susan Harris Rimmer has responded, however, the problem with a narrow focus
on operational prevention, and measures such as peacekeeping deployments and diplomatic
crisis management, is that such measures are not truly preventive, but respond to a crisis
already underway.75 Thus far within the debate, specific UN capacity for structural

prevention has received scant attention, and even in the few places it has been considered, it
has typically been only very briefly.76 Yet a careful examination of Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon’s 2009 report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect suggests that structural
prevention forms an integral component of operationalising RtoP. As the report notes:
Expanding development assistance to the “bottom billion” would undoubtedly have a net
positive effect on preventing crimes and violations relating to the responsibility to protect if
such assistance is targeted to give the poor and minority groups a stronger voice in their
societies, enhances equality and social justice, raises their education levels and increases their
opportunities for meaningful political participation. However, if additional assistance is
distributed in a way that exacerbates, rather than narrows, differences in the status and living
conditions of rival ethnic, religious or cultural communities within these societies, then the
net effect would be destabilising and could fuel existing tensions and resentments. Aid
programmes therefore need to be sensitive both to conflict and to the responsibility to
protect.77

The report goes on to identify five “critical” capacities, “drawn from the practice of
development assistance”.78
These include conflict-sensitive development analysis,
indigenous mediation capacity and local dispute resolution capacity. This suggests a clear
role for structural prevention within a broader preventive framework, and highlights how
important such work can be. It also builds upon the place accorded to structural prevention
within the original ICISS elucidation of the concept.79 In the final section of this paper,
below, UN capacity for structural prevention activities will be assessed.
United Nations Development Program
There is strong potential for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to make a
major contribution to the capacity of the UN for mass atrocity prevention through early stage
structural prevention work. Mainstreaming specific consideration of RtoP throughout the
development assistance programs of UNDP could ensure that development assistance is
delivered in a manner that also contributes to reducing risk factors for genocide and mass
atrocities. Programs might specifically target risk factors identified by the OSAPG, such as
‘tense inter-group relations’ or ‘weak institutional capacity to prevent genocide’, through
improving indigenous mediation capacity for example. Much of this work, however, would
not require the addition of specific programs, but rather involve tailoring existing programs to
mitigate risk wherever possible. For example, incorporating RtoP considerations into an aid
program might involve designing the program to ensure aid is distributed in ways that
provided equitable access for ethnic minorities, in a manner that does not inflame inter-ethnic
tensions.
In particular, there is a great deal of scope for integrating RtoP considerations into programs
targeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). There is substantial commonality
between many of the MDGs and the types of actions required for mass atrocity prevention.
Consider, for example, the first MDG, that of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger. As
former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan enunciated, “Every step taken towards reducing
poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth ... is a step toward conflict

prevention.”80 Of course it is important not to oversimplify the relationship between poverty
and the commission of mass atrocities, and to recognise both that mass atrocities can occur in
the absence of poverty, and that poverty is not always a risk factor.81 Yet in many cases it
can be a substantial contributing factor, and addressing poverty is widely regarded as a
structural prevention measure for reducing the likelihood of RtoP crimes. Similarly, goal
eight, that of developing a global partnership for development, is also an excellent example of
common ground. From an RtoP perspective, the level of ‘trade openness’ – that is economic
interdependence – is one of six key predictors of the likelihood of genocide and mass
atrocities developed through quantitative studies by the political scientist Barbara Harff.82
Nations with high levels of economic interdependence are far less likely to engage in mass
atrocity crimes, while economic isolation is a risk factor. Collaboration can also augment the
effectiveness of the MDG programs. At the simplest level, aid is more effective in reducing
poverty in politically stable nations, while nations exhibiting risk factors for genocide or mass
atrocities are typically poor and deteriorating environments for meeting the MDGs.83
Integrating RtoP considerations into UNDP programs targeting the MDGs, therefore, can be
mutually beneficial for both programs – and most importantly for the recipient nations
themselves.
Additional areas of Structural Prevention Capacity within the United Nations System
There are also substantial opportunities for the International Financial Institutions and the
United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) to each contribute to structural
prevention efforts. The facility of the World Bank in contributing to conflict prevention
through institutional capacity-building and conflict-sensitive development analysis has been
recognised by the Secretary-General.84 Mainstreaming RtoP considerations into the normal
procedures of the World Bank could contribute to strengthening the institutional capacity to
prevent genocide in poor nations, for example. Programs that integrate poverty-reduction and
risk-mitigation strategies could be mutually reinforcing for mass atrocity prevention. Finally,
UNITAR, “a small gem in the crown of the UN,” has a strong capacity to contribute to
structural prevention work through its extensive training and research capabilities.85

CONCLUSION
The findings of the above review of the capacity for mass atrocity prevention in the UN
system suggest there is a place for cautious optimism in considering the way forward. In the
Secretariat, the OSAPG and through the Secretary-General, there is already a wellestablished capacity for operational prevention. Furthermore, recent reports from both the
Secretary-General and the OSAPG suggest clear, practical and achievable routes to
strengthening that capacity further. There are also opportunities to substantially augment
capacity for prevention over time through incorporating specific considerations of RtoP
within normal operating procedures throughout relevant agencies of the UN. Thus far, there
has been very little consideration of the capacity of the UN for structural prevention. The
Secretary-General’s 2009 report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, however,

suggests an important place for structural prevention within the arsenal of preventive action.
As has been outlined above, there is strong potential for the UN to make a substantial
contribution to structural prevention through tailoring existing programs to incorporate RtoP
considerations and goals. While this would be a challenging undertaking, it is achievable
within the current UN structure, and has the potential to be of substantial impact over the
longer term. Alongside these positive findings, however, there exist concerning gaps within
the current system, for which no solution appears readily available. In particular, the capacity
of the Security Council to effective address situations in which urgent preventive action is
required is doubtful. This has the potential to impact upon the effectiveness of other
preventive actions, many of which are at least partially dependent upon a credible (if implicit)
threat of reaction. Unless and until this major gap in capacity is addressed, the capacity of
the UN for mass atrocity prevention will remain limited and incomplete.
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